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Recent Developments 
Stanford v. Kentucky: IMPOSITION 
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ON AN 
INDMDUAL FOR A CRIME 
COMMITI'ED AT SIXTEEN OR 
SEVENTEEN YEARS OF AGE DOES 
NOT VIOlATE EIGHTII AMENDMENT 
In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. _, 
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), the Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion delivered by 
Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief 
Justice Reinquist, Justice White and Jus-
tice Kennedy, held that sentencing a 
person to death for a crime committed 
while the offender was sixteen or seven-
teen years of age did not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment as prohibited 
by the eighth amendment. The Court re-
viewed legislative enactments concern-
ing capital punishment to establish a 
national consensus that such punish-
ment does not violate evolving standards 
of decency of modern American society. 
The Court considered two consoli-
dated cases. In the first case, Kevin Stan-
ford was seventeen years old in January, 
1981, when he and an accomplice repeat-
edly raped and sodomized a twenty year-
old female attendant during the robbery 
of a gas station. Afterwards, they drove 
the attendant to a secluded area where 
Stanford shot her, point-blank in the face 
and in the back of the head. 
A Kentucky statute provides that a juve-
nile can be tried as an adult if he is 
charged with a Class A felony or capital 
crime, or is over sixteen years of age and 
charged with a felony. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 208.170 (MichieJBobbs-Merrill 1982). 
Applying this statute, a Kentucky juvenile 
court waived juvenile jurisdiction and 
, transferred the case for trial as an adult. 
Convicted of murder, first-degree sod-
omy, first-degree robbery and receiving 
stolen property, Stanford was sentenced 
to death and forty-five years in prison'. 
Stanford, 109 S, Ct. at 2973. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court held, in affirming 
the death sentence, that the juvenile 
court had properly certified Stanford for 
trial as an adult, since '''there was no 
program or treatment appropriate for 
appellant in the juvenile justice system. '" 
[d. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 734 
S.W.2d 781, 792 (Ky. 1987). 
In the second case, Heath Wilkins, at 
the age of sixteen, in July, 1985, stabbed 
to death a twenty-six year old mother of 
two who was working in a convenience 
store that she and her husband owned 
and operated. Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
211.071 (1986), which permits individu-
als between fourteen and seventeen 
years of age who have committed felonies 
to be tried as adults, the juvenile court 
terminated juvenile-court jurisdiction 
and certified Wilkins for trial as an adult. 
After Wilkins entered 'gUilty pleas to 
charges of first-degree murder, armed 
criminal action and carrying a concealed 
weapon, the trial court determined that 
the death penalty was appropriate. The 
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the 
punishment imposed did not violate the 
eighth amendment and affirmed the 
sentence.ld. at 2974. 
Both Stanford and Wilkins contended 
that imposition of the death penalty on 
criminals who were juveniles at the time 
they committed their crimes, violated the 
eighth amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the 
eighth amendment "'in a flexible and 
dynamic manner.'" [d. (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S, 153, 171 (1976», and 
determined that a particular punishment 
violates the amendment when it is con-
trary to the '''evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society. '" [d. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion». 
To determine "evolving standards of 
decency," the Court looked first to stat-
utes passed by state legislatures. The 
Court found that fifteen of the thirty-
seven states allowing capital punishment 
do not impose it on sixteen year old of-
fenders, and twelve of those states do not 
impose it on seventeen year old offend-
ers. Thus, the majority of states allowing 
capital punishment do extend capital 
punishment to sixteen and seventeen 
year old offenders. The Court found simi-
lar congressional sentiment on this issue 
reflected in 18 U.S.c. § 5032 (Supp. V 
1982), which permits sixteen and seven-
teen year olds, after appropriate find-
ings, "to be tried and punished as adults 
for all federal offenses, including those 
bearing a capital penalty that is not lim-
ited to eighteen year olds." [d. at 2976. 
The Court concluded that, based on the 
pattern of federal and state laws, the na-
tional consensus previously considered 
sufficient to label a punishment cruel 
and unusual had not been established. 
Stanford argued both that the laws did 
not establish a settled national consen-
sus, and that the application of enacted 
statutes should be considered by the 
Court. Since the death sentence is rarely 
imposed on persons under eighteen, 
Stanford claimed that the death penalty 
for such offenders was categorically un-
acceptable to prosecutors and jurors. 
The Court held, to the contrary, that the 
reluctant application of death penalty 
statutes to minors indicated that the con-
siderations which led Stanford to believe 
that the death penalty should never be 
imposed on offenders under eighteen 
are the same considerations which lead 
prosecutors and juries to believe that it 
should rarely be imposed.ld. at 2977. 
The Court was also unpersuaded by 
Stanford's reliance on state laws which 
set eighteen as the legal age for engaging 
in activities such as driving, drinking al-
coholic beverages, and voting. The Court 
considered those laws irrelevant, be-
cause they operate in gross, i.e., they do 
not conduct individualized maturity tests 
for each driver, drinker, or voter. In con-
trast, the Court noted that the criminal 
justice system requires individualized 
consideration. 
Twenty-nine States, including 
both Kentucky and Missouri, have 
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codified this constitutional require-
ment in laws specifically designating 
the defendant's age as a mitigating 
factor in capital cases. Moreover, the 
determinations required by juvenile 
transfer statutes to certify a juvenile 
for trial as an adult ensure individu-
alized consideration of the maturity 
and moral responsibility of sixteen 
and seventeen year-old offenders be-
fore they are even held to stand trial 
as adults. 
[d. at 2978. 
Similarly, the Court rejected Stan-
ford's reliance on public opinion polls, 
the views of public interest groups and 
the poSitions of professional associations 
as indicia of a national consensus, declar-
ing them insufficient foundations on 
which to rest constitutional law. "A ... 
national consensus so broad, so clear 
and so enduring as to justify a permanent 
prohibition upon all units of democratic 
government must appear in the opera-
tive acts (laws and application of laws) 
that the people have approved." [d. at 
2979. 
Finally, the Court deemed it unneces-
sary to conduct a proportionality test: to . 
examine whether "there is a dispropor-
tion between the punishment imposed 
and the defendant's blameworthiness." 
[d. at 2980. This test is used only where 
there is objective evidence of a societal 
consensus against the penalty; no such 
evidence existed in this case. [d. 
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan 
criticized the Court's reliance on legisla-
tive enactments to determine that the 
capital punishment of sixteen or seven-
teen year old offenders did not offend 
'''evolving standards of decency ... · [d. at 
2982 (quoting Trop v. Dulles) This ap-
proach returned to the task of defining 
eighth amendment protection to the very 
political majorities the framers sought to 
deny such power. '''One's right to life, 
liberty, and property, . . . and other 
fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome 
of no elections.'" [d. at 2987 (quoting 
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Furthermore, 
the dissent indicated that the plurality's 
discussion of state laws was distorted 
since it failed to account for the fifteen 
states (and the District of Columbia) 
which do not authorize capital punish-
ment at all. [d. at 2982-83. 
Justice Brennan also characterized the 
Court's review of legislative enactments 
to establish a national consensus as in-
complete. He argued that the rare appli-
cation of the death sentence for youthful 
offenders, the decisions of respected 
organizations in relevant fields that the 
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penalty was unacceptable, and its rejec-
tion by governments around the world, 
were strong indications that the execu-
tion of adolescents violated contempo-
rary standards of decency and should 
have been included in the Court's 
analysis. [d. at 2984-85. 
The dissent criticized the plurality's 
refusal to conduct proportionality analy-
sis. "There can be no doubt at this point 
in our constitutional history that the 
eighth amendment forbids punishment 
that is wholly disproportionate to the 
blameworthiness of the offender." [d. at 
2987. The dissent noted that in American 
society, juveniles are treated differently 
from adults. As a class, they do not have 
the level of maturation and responsibility 
presumed in adults. "'The reasons why 
juveniles are not trusted with the privi-
leges and responsibilities of an adult also 
explain why their irresponsible conduct 
is not as morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult. .. • [d. at 2988 (quoting 7bomp-
sonv. Oklahoma, 487 U.S._, 108S.Ct, 
2687,2699 (1988)). In Brennan's view, 
"[j]uveniles very generally lack that de-
gree of blameworthiness that is ... a con-
stitutional prerequisite for the imposi-
tion of capital punishment under our 
precedents concerning the eighth 
amendment proportionality principle." 
[d. at 2992. 
In a plurality opinion, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the im-
position of the death penalty on offend-
ers who were sixteen or seventeen years 
old at the time they committed their 
crimes did not violate the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment, because such pen-
alty was not considered cruel and un-
usual at the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted, and no national consensus 
against the execution of such youthful 
offenders had been established. 
-Mary Jo Murphy 
Gray v. State: COURT UPHELD 
TRlALJUDGE'S DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO REQUIRE A 
PROSECUTOR TO TESTIFY OR BE 
CROSS-EXAMINED FOR ALLEGED 
DISCRIMINATION IN SELECTING 
JURORS 
In Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 562 A.2d 
1278 (1989), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a prosecutor is not 
required to testify under oath or be sub-
jected to cross-examination when offer-
ing non-discriminatory explanations for 
the striking of black venire persons from 
the jury panel. 
Isaac Gray, a black male, \!las tried in 
the Circuit Court for Howard County for 
the first degree rape of a white woman. 
Upon completion of the jury selection 
process, Gray moved for a mistrial, alleg-
ing that since the prosecutor had used 
four of his peremptory challenges to 
strike black jurors from the panel, the 
state must advance an explanation for 
these challenges. [d. at 252-53, 562 A.2d 
at 1279. Relying on Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965), the trial judge held 
that a prosecutor was not required to 
give explanations for the exercise of per-
emptory challenges. Gray, 317 Md. at 
253 n.2, 562 A.2d at 1279 n.2. Despite 
the court's ruling, the prosecutor volun-
teered a non-discriminatory reason for 
one of his strikes and noted that the jury, 
as impaneled, included one black juror 
and one black alternate juror. [d. at 253, 
562 A.2d at 1280. The trial judge denied 
the defendant's motion and Gray was 
subsequently convicted. 
Gray filed a motion for a new trial. At 
the hearing, Gray argued that Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), decided 
after Gray's trial on the merits, was appli-
cable to the facts of his case. Gray, 317 
Md. at 253, 562 A.2d at 1280. Batson 
held that where the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding a prosecutor's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges estab-
lished a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation, the burden was on the state to 
justify the challenges with a non-dis-
criminatory explanation. Gray argued 
that a prima facie showing had been 
established and, therefore, the state was 
required to provide a racially neutral rea-
son for the challenge. The prosecutor 
denied the allegations of discrimination 
and stated his reasons for striking each of 
the black jurors. The trial judge denied 
the motion for a new trial, based on his 
belief that Batson was not meant to be 
applied retroactively, and that, not-
withstanding Batson, the ratio of black 
jurors to the other jurors exceeded the 
ratio of blacks to all persons living in the 
county at that time. [d. at 253-54, 562 
A.2d at 1280. 
On appeal, the court of special appeals 
vacated the judgment and remanded the 
case for a determination of whether Gray 
had established a prima facie showing of 
racial discrimination, and, if so, whether 
the state had sufficiently rebutted the 
showing, in accord with the two-part test 
of Batson. [d. at 254,562 A.2d at 1280. At 
this hearing, counsel for the defendant 
requested, pursuant to a witness sub-
poena which had been served on the 
prosecutor, that the prosecutor be 
placed under oath before giving his rea-
sons for his jury strikes and that while 
under oath, he be subject to cross-exami-
nation. Gray argued that there was a 
guaranteed right to an adversarial hear-
